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Abstract- This paper proposes a Three-Stage Model for 
transmission augmentation in restructured electricity 
markets. The mathematical formulation of the model is 
developed based on the game theory. Transmission 
Network Service Provider, TNSP, Generating Companies, 
GenCos, and Market Management Company, MMC, are 
placed in different stages of the model. These stages are 
linked to each other using the Leader-followers game and 
the concept of Nash equilibriums. An increase in 
transmission capacity can have two benefits for the 
electricity market; firstly, efficiency benefit in terms of 
improving the social surplus of the electricity industry, 
and, secondly, competition benefit which leads to 
increasing competition among generating companies. The 
introduced Three-Stage Model can capture both benefits 
of transmission projects in electricity markets. An effective 
numerical method is designed for solving the developed 
Three-Stage Model. A modified IEEE 14 example system 
is employed to show the effectiveness of the methodology. 
This paper has been organized in two parts. First part deals with 
the mathematical formulation of the algorithm and second part 
deals with the numerical studies. What follows is the second part 
of the paper. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO PART II  
The part I of the paper explained the developed mathematical 
framework for augmenting of the transmission system. The 
developed mathematical framework employs the leader-
followers ‘concept in its formulation. The final formulation is 
a equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints which 
accommodates all engaged parties in transmission planning 
problem. The mathematical framework and the developed 
numerical solution are detailed in the part I of the paper. To 
show the effectiveness of the framework IEEE 14 bus test 
system is used. The test system has been modified so that it 
can show different aspects of the developed framework. The 
rest of paper has organized as follows; section 2 deals with the 
application of the method to the modified IEEE 14 bus test 
system. Further discussion on the model has been provided in 
section 3. Finally, the concluding remarks will close the paper.  
 
II. APPLICATION TO THE MODIFIED IEEE 14-BUS 
EXAMPLE SYSTEM  
The modified IEEE 14 bus test system depicted in figure 1 has 
been employed to show the effectiveness of the proposed 
algorithm.  
  
Fig. 1, Modified IEEE 14 bus test system 
 
There are five competing generators labelled as G1 to G5, 
and eleven competing retailers labelled as R1 to R11 in the 
14-bus example system. The TNSP is responsible for the 
market-based augmentation of the system. The information of 
the generators, retailers, and transmission network are shown 
in tables I, II, and III respectively. The upgrade or expansion 
projects for the existing transmission system are collected in 
table IV. 
TABLE I GENERATORS ‘DATA 
Generator (MW) (MW) ($/MWh) 
G1 0.0 132.4 39.2 
G2 0.0 80 25.2 
G3 0.0 120 6.7 
G4 0.0 70 21.5 
G5 0.0 140 12.7 
TABLE II RETAILERS ‘DATA 
Retailer (MW) (MW) ($/MWh) 
R1 0 41.7 151 
R2 0 184.2 177 
R3 0 87.8 154 
R4 0 14.6 157 
R5 0 21.2 153 
R6 0 49.5 165 
R7 0 9 169 
R8 0 6.5 153 
R9 0 12.1 166 
R10 0 26.5 156 
R11 0 28.9 158 
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TABLE III TRANSMISSION NETWORK DATA 
Line# From To Reactance(p.u.) Limit(MW) 
1 B1 B2 0.05917 50 
2 B1 B5 0.22304 50 
3 B2 B3 0.19797 50 
4 B2 B4 0.17632 50 
5 B2 B5 0.17388 50 
6 B3 B4 0.17103 50 
7 B4 B5 0.04211 50 
8 B4 B7 0.20912 50 
9 B4 B9 0.55618 50 
10 B5 B6 0.25202 50 
11 B6 B11 0.19890 50 
12 B6 B12 0.25581 50 
13 B6 B13 0.13027 50 
14 B7 B8 0.17615 50 
15 B7 B9 0.11001 50 
16 B9 B10 0.08450 50 
17 B9 B14 0.27038 50 
18 B10 B11 0.19207 50 
19 B12 B13 0.19988 50 
20 B13 B14 0.34802 50 
 
TABLE IV TRANSMISSION NETWORK UPGRADE OR EXPANSION DATA 
 
Project # Type of project From To 
Max Capacity per circuit (MW)/ maximum 
no. of circuits Investment cost($) 
0 No upgrade or expansion - - - - 
1 Upgrade B1 B2 100/4 5000 
2 Upgrade B1 B5 100/4 7500 
3 Upgrade B2 B3 100/4 2250 
4 Upgrade B2 B4 100/4 1750 
5 Upgrade B2 B5 100/4 3750 
6 Upgrade B3 B4 100/4 6250 
7 Upgrade B12 B13 100/4 5500 
8 Upgrade B13 B14 100/4 1120 
9 Expansion B1 B12 100/4 2500 
10 Expansion B10 B3 100/4 2000 
 
For demonstration purposes, the reactances of transmission 
upgrade projects in table IV are considered the same as the 
reactances of transmission lines established in their parallel 
corridors. The reactnces of lines 21 and 22 which are the 
expansion projects in table IV are taken as 0.02p.u . 
In applying Three-stage Model on the modified IEEE 14-
bus example system, the maximum number of iterations in 
Gauss-Seidel method has set to be 5 with an accuracy limit of 
0.001. Regarding the bid specifications of the GenCos, the 
 is 0.8 times of true marginal cost and  is 3.0 times 
of true marginal cost and this setting is the same for all 
GenCos. 50 iterations, a step factor of 0.01 and accuracy limit 
of 0.001 have been used for solving the revenue maximisation 
of GenCos. Two cases of without monopoly rent and with 
monopoly rent have been studied and compared. 
Case 1: Without monopoly rent ( 1.0 ) 
Table V and VI show the strategic bidding of each GenCo to 
different transmission projects, monopoly rent of each GenCo, 
total monopoly rent of the system, MR, and social surplus, SS 
in the first iteration of Three-stage Model.  
 
 
TABLE V STRATEGIC BIDDINGS OF GENCOS, MR, SS, AND INVESTMENT COST IN THE FIRST ITERATION OF THREE-STAGE MODEL 
 No. of Transmission Upgrade or Expansion Project 
 0 1 2 3 4 
Bid of GenCo1 with MC = 39.2 ($/MW) 109.55 109.55 109.55 39.2 109.55 
Bid of GenCo2 with MC = 25.2 ($/MW) 40.95 40.95 40.95 20.16 40.95 
Bid of GenCo3 with MC = 6.7 ($/MW) 5.36 5.36 5.36 5.36 5.36 
Bid of GenCo4 with MC = 21.5 ($/MW) 59.95 59.95 59.95 59.34 59.95 
Bid of GenCo5 with MC = 12.7 ($/MW) 35.43 35.43 35.43 35.42 35.43 
MR of GenCo1($) 2501 2501 2501 0 2501 
MR of GenCo2($) 5925 5925 5925 2755 5925 
MR of GenCo3($) 6090 6090 6090 4736 6090 
MR of GenCo4($) 2269 2269 2269 1230 2269 
MR of GenCo5($) 2321 2321 2321 2300 2321 
Total MR ($) 19107 19107 19107 11021 19107 
SS ($) 49283 49283 49283 55342 49283 
Investment Cost ($) 0 500 750 2250 1750 
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TABLE VI STRATEGIC BIDDINGS OF GENCOS, MR, SS, AND INVESTMENT COST IN THE FIRST ITERATION OF THREE-STAGE MODEL (CONTINUED) 
 No. of Transmission Upgrade or Expansion Project 
 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bid of GenCo1 with MC = 39.2 ($/MW) 109.55 109.55 78.4 109.55 74.73 110.43 
Bid of GenCo2 with MC = 25.2 ($/MW) 40.95 40.95 47.88 40.95 70.68 40.95 
Bid of GenCo3 with MC = 6.7 ($/MW) 5.36 5.36 5.36 5.36 5.36 5.36 
Bid of GenCo4 with MC = 21.5 ($/MW) 59.95 59.95 59.62 59.95 60.12 17.2 
Bid of GenCo5 with MC = 12.7 ($/MW) 35.43 35.43 35.59 35.43 10.16 35.51 
MR of GenCo1($) 2501 2501 1219 2501 114 3346 
MR of GenCo2($) 5925 5925 3145 5925 2877 6174 
MR of GenCo3($) 6090 6090 4613 6090 3727 4843 
MR of GenCo4($) 2269 2269 1702 2269 2557 -16 
MR of GenCo5($) 2321 2321 2787 2321 5553 2557 
Total MR ($) 19107 19107 13466 19107 14828 16920 
SS ($) 49283 49283 50492 49283 52789 56765 
Investment Cost ($) 3750 6250 5500 1120 2500 2000 
SS-MR-Cost($) 29801 29551 36476 29056 35461 37845 
 
As in tables V and VI, positive effect of transmission 
capacity on MR has been indicated by underlined and bold 
figures. Bold figures show the negative effect of transmission 
capacity on MR in term of increasing the MR compared with 
no action case. When transmission capacity does not have any 
effect on MR, it has been shown by usual figures. 
Transmission upgrades 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 do not have any 
effect on MRs of GenCos. Upgrade of transmission corridor 3 
by 100MW would decrease the GenCo 1’s MR from $2501 to 
$0. Similarly, transmission project 3 has a positive effect of 
53%, 22.23%, 45.79%, and 0.9% in decreasing the monopoly 
rents of GenCos 2 to 5. Hence, transmission upgrade 3 could 
be evaluated as a very good upgrade in terms of MRs of 
GenCos. Going to transmission project 7, it has positive 
effects of 51.26%, 46.91%, 24.25%, and 24.98% in decreasing 
the monopoly rents of GenCos 1 to 4. However, upgrading of 
transmission corridor 7 increases the monopoly rent of GenCo 
5 from $2321 to $2787 which is about -20%. The same effect 
can be observed in the monopoly rent of GenCo 5 for 
transmission project 9. In this case, the GenCo 5 enjoys from a 
139.25% increase in his monopoly rent. Accordingly, GenCo 
5 would advocate transmission project 9 instead of 
transmission project 3 in which he loses $21 of his monopoly 
rent. Obviously, TNSPs owned and operated by GenCos may 
not advocate optimal transmission expansion strategy.  
Figure 3 shows the objective function of TNSP (partition 3 
of equation (8)) versus the transmission projects. TNSP would 
select transmission project 3 with the total benefit of $42071.
 
 
Figure 3, First iteration of Three-stage Model  
 
In the next iteration, the Three-stage Model upgrades the 
transmission corridor B1-B2 by 100MW. This results to the 
social surplus of $59731 and monopoly rent of -$133, -$76, 
and $-144 for GenCos 1 to 3 and $0 for GenCos 4 and 5. The 
cost-benefit analysis introduced in Three-stage Model 
approves transmission projects of 3 and 1 and the rests can not 
get approved. Based on the Three-stage Model, the approval is 
based on the capturing the competition benefit and efficiency 
benefit of transmission projects. This has been shown in figure 
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Figure 4, Effect of transm
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As in table VII, using the Three-stage Model, with modelling 
the without monopoly rent effect of transmission capacity, the 
transmission planning schedule results in %21.2 increase in 
social surplus of the electricity industry and 
simultaneously %42.32 decrease in monopoly rent and 
consequently increase of competition among GenCos. In case 
of 0  or without modelling competition effect of 
transmission capacity, we have an increase of %28.38 in 
social surplus which is only %7.18 more than social surplus of 
without monopoly rent case. While, monopoly rent has an 
increase of %14.65 with respect to state of electricity market 
before expansion or in other words decreasing competition 
among GenCos. Results of table VII clearly show that ,firstly, 
transmission capacity has a significant effect on promoting 
competition among GenCos and ,secondly, the proposed 
Three-stage Model can augment transmission system not only 
in terms of increasing the social surplus of the electricity 
industry but also in terms of promoting competition among 
GenCos. Accordingly, Three-stage Model can capture both 
efficient effect and competition effect of transmission capacity 
in an integrated mathematical framework for optimum 
augmentation of the transmission system.  
 
III. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THREE-STAGE MODEL  
In the proposed Three-stage Model, it is also possible to 
consider the retailers bidding strategy. The retailers would be 
treated as individual players in the game formulates as the 
partition 2 of (8). Mathematically speaking the equation (6) 
would be modified as (15). Ω. .  Ω. .1, … ,   1, … ,  (15) 
Where in (15), the first maximisation problem iterates over all 
GenCos and the second one iterates over all retailers.  
Also, for considering the dynamic nature of the load, one can 
divide the horizon year period into different segments, like 12 
months, 48 weeks, or if necessary 8064 hours per year, and 
runs the Three-stage Model in each segment of horizon year 
period. After comparing the results of expansion, the more 
robust transmission lines which have the highest effect over 
all segments can be chosen.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION OF PART I AND II  
It is critical for a TNSP to have a good planning 
framework in order to (1) capture the real value of 
transmission projects in terms of efficiency benefit and 
competition benefit, (2) model the interaction of market 
participants in a proper and integrated mathematical 
framework and (3) produce the best transmission planning 
schedule in terms of the investment cost of expansions. 
Addressing these issues, a Three-stage Model is introduced. 
The first phase models the TNSP’s objective function. TNSP 
finds the optimum expansion schedule through a step-by-step 
expansion methodology. In phase two, the competition among 
GenCos is modelled through Nash equilibriums. The revenue 
maximisation problem of each GenCo is modelled using a 
bilevel programming problem. Gradient search method with 
the proper partitioning of GenCo’s bidding space is used for 
solving the introduced bilevel problem. The Nash equilibrium 
point is found using the iterative Gauss-Seidel method. Finally, 
phase three deals with the Market Management Company, 
MMC. MMC clears the market using a security-constrained 
economic dispatch. A revised simplex method is used for 
solving the MMC optimisation problem.  
The three phases of the Three-stage Model are linked 
through the static version of Leader-followers game. TNSP 
moves first and makes its decision taking into account all 
possible responses from GenCos, MMC and considering the 
efficiency benefit, competition benefit, and associate costs of 
each transmission project. GenCos take the final decision of 
the TNSP and compete for gaining the highest revenue from 
the electricity market. In doing so, they consider all possible 
responses from other GenCos and MMC. The final bidding 
strategy is submitted to the MMC and MMC clears the market 
in the third phase. A modified 14-bus example system is 
employed to show the proposed method.  
The numerical results show that (1) transmission capacity 
has obvious effects on both efficiency and competitiveness of 
electricity markets (2) expansion of one transmission corridor 
can increase or decrease market power and consequently can 
have negative and positive competitiveness effect (3) TNSPs 
owned and operated by GenCos may not advocate optimal 
transmission expansion and (4) considering the strategic 
behaviours of GenCos the congestion-driven transmission 




The introduced vectors and matrices in (9) in terms of vectors 








 and  are the matrices which determine the 
transmission connection buses of the registered generators 
and retailers in the electricity market. 
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